Sixth Circuit Rules that Employers' Unenforced Policies Can Be the Basis for a Lawsuit
Stites & Harbison Client Alert, October 17, 2017
Employers have a new reason to review that dusty employee handbook that may have been left untouched for years. In Stein et al. v. hhgregg, Inc., et al., a divided Sixth Circuit ruled that an employerâs having an unlawful policy on the books, even if that policy has never actually been enforced against an employee, can be sufficient in at least some circumstances for an employeeâs lawsuit to survive a motion to dismiss in federal court.
Stein involved hhgreggâs compensation policy for their retail and sales employees. Under the policy, employees are paid solely on the basis of commission. If an employeeâs commission for a given week falls below the minimum-wage requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act (âFLSAâ), the employee is advanced a âdrawâ so that the employeeâs weekly pay meets the minimum wage. The amount of the draw is then deducted from the employeeâs future earnings in weeks where the employeeâs commission exceeds the minimum wage. Additionally, the policy as-written states that employees must repay hhgregg for any outstanding draws upon their termination.
The plaintiffs are one current employee and one former employee, and they brought their lawsuit on behalf of themselves as well as all other current and former hhgregg employees. The draw policy was enforced against the plaintiffs during their employment. However, the plaintiffsâ complaint does not allege that hhgregg ever demanded that any former employee repay his or her draws upon leaving hhgregg. Similarly, at oral argument, hhgreggâs counsel unequivocally stated that the company has never collected, and has no intention of ever attempting to collect, unpaid draws after an employee is terminated.
All three members of the Sixth Circuit panel were in agreement that hhgreggâs draw policy for active employees was permitted under the FLSAâs âfree and clearâ regulation (29 C.F.R. § 531.35), which requires that the minimum wage be paid âfinally and unconditionally or âfree and clear.ââ The regulation prohibits employers from requiring their employees to pay back any part of their minimum wage after the funds have already been distributed; however, the regulation does not prohibit employers from making deductions from wages that have not yet been distributed. As a result, the Sixth Circuit concluded that hhgreggâs policy for active employeesâdeducting the draws from future wages before those wages are ever paid out to employeesâis permissible.
Additionally, the panel unanimously agreed that hhgreggâs post-termination policy, if enforced, would violate the âfree and clearâ regulation, because it would require employees to return their minimum wage after the funds have been distributed. However, the panel members parted ways on whether the plaintiffsâ complaint stated viable causes of action in light of the fact that hhgreggâs post-termination policy had not actually been enforced against them.
The majority held that the plaintiffsâ allegation that hhgreggâs policy required an employee to âimmediately pay [defendants] any unpaid Deficit amountsâ upon termination was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, notwithstanding the fact that the complaint did not allege that the policy had actually been enforced against the plaintiffs. The majority reasoned that â[e]ven if defendants never demanded repayment in practice, an employee may believe he owes a debt to the company for which he could be made responsible at a later date. Incurring a debt, or even believing that one has incurred a debt, has far-reaching practical implications for individuals.â
In dissent, Judge Sutton opined that because the plaintiffsâ complaint does not allege that hhgregg ever demanded that employees repay a draw after they left the company, and because the plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the post-termination policy was never applied to them, âthere is no plausible factual predicate for [the plaintiffsâ] claim.â Accordingly, Judge Sutton believed that the plaintiffsâ complaint failed to satisfy the Twombly-Iqbal federal pleading standard.
Stein could have lasting effects well outside of the context of the FLSAâs âfree and clearâ regulation. Steinâs holding indicates that employees can survive a motion to dismiss in federal court merely by alleging that an employer has an unlawful policy that could theoretically be enforced against them, regardless of whether or not the policy was so enforced, at least where it could be argued that the policyâs existence has some âpractical implicationsâ for the employees. For this reason, employers would be wise to review their existing handbooks to ensure that problematic policies are not lurking on the books, even if those policies have not been enforced in practice.